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When Geneva Agreements dividing Vietnam were reached in the early morning hours of 21 July 
1954, the Article 14(d) of those accords was considered to be a minor, technical one. It guaranteed 
free movement of people between opposite sides’ zones, so they could move to the half of Vietnam 
they preferred. The authorities in both the South and the North didn’t expect more than several tens 
of thousands of people. Instead, the South was fl ooded with a vast wave of refugees, numbering in 
hundreds of thousands. Geneva Conference also established the International Commission for Su-
pervision and Control, composed of India, Canada and Poland, to oversee the implementation of the 
Geneva Accords in Indochina. One of its most important tasks was to supervise the aforementioned 
free movement of people. In this article, I would like to show how internal diff erences between 
the countries making the ICSC aff ected the supervision of Article 14(d), particularly in respect of 
activities of communist side, which actively tried to prevent people from leaving North Vietnam.
Keywords: Geneva Agreements, International Commission for Supervision and Control, Migra-
tion, Operation Passage to Freedom, Vietnam, Vietnam War.
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND THE SPLIT OF VIETNAM
In 1954 the Indochina War between French and Viet Minh forces reached its cli-
max. After eight long years of exhausting warfare, both sides clashed in decisive battle 
for the Dien Bien Phu fortress, located in an isolated valley in the north Vietnam from 
which it took her name. Fierce and merciless combat went on for almost two months, 
when, after pulling in every possible reserve, communist troops of Viet Minh won, 
planting their battle standard on the French command post on 7 May 1954. On the very 
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next day the Indochina part of Geneva Conference started. The talks dragged on, hin-
dered by the contradicting interests of great powers. In the end, cease-fi re agreements 
were signed, and Final Declaration accepted only around 3 AM on 21 July.1
Geneva Accords partitioned Vietnam into two parts: southern, ruled by the pro-
western State of Vietnam, and northern, governed by the communist Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam (DRV), with dividing line set at 17th parallel, where Demilitarized 
Zone was established. In two years, both parties were to organize the unifi cation 
elections, which were to decide the fate of whole Vietnam. Troops of both sides were 
supposed to regroup into designated zones, and ceasefi re was implemented in whole 
country.
What is most interesting and important from the point of view of this paper, Ar-
ticle 14(d) of the Geneva Accords said: “from the date of entry into force of the pre-
sent Agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in 
a district controlled by one party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the 
other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district.”2
This was further reinforced by the Point 8 of Final Declaration of the Geneva 
Conference: “the provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended 
to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied 
and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely in which zone 
he wishes to live.”
The ensure the proper realization of those agreements, Article 34 of Geneva Agree-
ments established an special, international body: “An International Commission shall 
be set up for the control and supervision over the application of the provisions of the 
agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam. It shall be composed of repre-
sentatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland. It shall be presided over 
by the Representative of India.”
THE COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE WORK OF ICSC
Each of the three countries chosen to cooperate in the International Commission 
for Supervision and Control had diff erent motivation and reasons to accept the re-
quest of Geneva Conference powers. 
India was not one of the negotiating powers participating in the Geneva Confer-
ence. However, Indian diplomats were constantly present in Switzerland, and were 
heavily involved in the backstage discussions during the course of whole negotia-
tions, promoting their role of a neutral power that was supposed to help the two hos-
tile blocs in coming to an agreement. British Foreign Offi  ce even suspected Krishna 
Menon, Indian Ambassador to the United Nations and close confi dante of prime min-
1  The offi  cial date on all documents is 20 July 20 1954, since the French prime minister pledged to 
resign if agreements were not reached by that date.
2  The time foreseen for troop movement was 300 days.
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ister Jawaharlal Nehru, of being the real force behind the Chinese proposal for the 
fi nal composition of the ICSC. India’s participation in the Supervisory Commission 
was therefore a logical continuation of this policy. For Indians it was a part of build-
ing the world-wide prestige of their young country – the only real neutral power, as 
they liked to think of themselves. However, at the same time India had very specifi c 
political, cultural and economical interests in Southeast Asia, and participation in 
ICSC was one of ways to protect them. Motives of Polish and Canadian participation 
in the work of the Commission were a bit more complex.
Canadians came to Vietnam as representatives of the Western World. Canada did 
not have any vital interests in Southeast Asia at that time, and the proposal to par-
ticipate in the work of ICSC was greeted in Ottawa without much enthusiasm. While 
taking part in the work of the Commission was undoubtedly very prestigious, it was 
also linked with some serious problems and risks. It would mean the need to organize 
a highly specialized and large delegation of several hundred people, which would put 
a signifi cant burden on the Canadian military and diplomatic corps. However, what 
was feared most was the reaction of the United States. Close ally and guarantor of the 
Canada’s security openly manifested dissatisfaction with the results of the Geneva 
Conference.
In a certain sense Canada fell a victim of her own existing diplomatic activity (fi f-
ties were the Golden Age of Canadian Foreign Policy, with crowning jewel of Nobel 
Peace Prize for minister Lester Pearson in year 1957) and as High Commissioner in 
London wrote to his superior in Ottawa, “task suggested is certainly ungrateful but 
I do not see how we can do other than accept it.”3 In addition, Canadian worries about 
American reaction were somehow dispelled when Washington assured Ottawa that 
they would by no means hold participation in the work of ICSC against their northern 
neighbor, and in fact were very pleased that it would be Canada that would be a rep-
resenting the West World in the Commission. In the end, on 28 July 1954, Ottawa 
decided to respond positively to the invitation, accepting participation in the work of 
the Commission as her “stern international duty”4 and acknowledging that “there was 
probably no other Western country in a better position than Canada to work harmoni-
ously and eff ectively with India”.5
As Canada had no prior knowledge of Indochina,6 it was forced to ask U.S. De-
partment of State for necessary materials about the region. There was also already 
3  High Commissioner in United Kingdom to Secretary of State for External Aff airs, Telegram 845, 
July 19, 1954, International Supervisory Commission – Indo-China, ed. G. Donaghy [in:] Documents 
on Canadian External Relations, vol. 20: 1954, Ottawa 1997, pp. 1676–1677.
4  Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Aff airs, Telegram WA-1302, 
July 24, 1954, Indo-China Supervisory Commissions [in:] Documents on Canadian External Relations, 
pp. 1686–1687.
5  Extract from Cabinet Conclusions, July 28, 1954, Indo-China, Membership in International 
Supervisory Commissions for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia [in:] Documents on Canadian External 
Relations, pp. 1695–1697.
6  Only Canadian enterprise in Indochina in previous decades was a spy ring formed by a Canadian 
citizen Laurence Gordon during World War II. L. Sobolewski, Indochiny Francuskie w polityce Japonii 
w latach 1940–1945, Warszawa 2011, p. 203.
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aforementioned issue of fi nding qualifi ed personnel in enough quantity. In addition, 
Canadians were deeply troubled by Polish participation in the ICSC, foreseeing seri-
ous problems in day-to-day functioning of the Commission, as they expected worst 
from their communist partners, including off ensive words, personal insults and using 
every possible tactic to delay or obstruct the activities of ICSC.7
In contrast to Ottawa, dilemmas tied to the participation in the Commission are 
hard to fi nd in Polish archives. The order sent from Moscow had to be carried out and 
the authorities in Warsaw responded affi  rmatively to the invitation sent by Molotov 
and Eden on 23 July, only a day after receiving the message from the Conference co-
chairmen. Preparatory work actually began earlier, on 20 July, so even before the of-
fi cial publication of the Geneva Conference results. Polish People’s Republic was not 
a truly independent state in 1954. Stalin was dead for barely little more than a year, 
and smaller communist countries were only cautiously beginning to form their own 
foreign policies in the framework imposed by their Soviet overseers. Poland was no 
exception. However, as the strongest and largest of the USSR satellite states, Polish 
People’s Republic had an ambition to play a much larger role in the world than fel-
low fraternal states from the progressive bloc. Participation in the work of esteemed 
international bodies, like ICSC, was perceived as a fi ne way of gaining prestige and 
recognition on the world stage. What’s more, Warsaw deemed that their participation 
in the work of the Commission was enhancing the Polish position in the Eastern Bloc 
itself, since it meant in a way that Poland was given a task to help and protect the 
newly-born communist state of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Last but not 
least, Poles already had a bit of international experience in the matter, because since 
year 1953 they were part of the Neutral Commission in Korea.
However, being suddenly faced with the obligation to send a huge delegation to 
the other side of the world, Poland was faced with various challenges of such diverse 
nature as transport, proper uniforms and equipment, and health issues. But the key 
and almost impossible challenge was fi nding proper number of English and French 
speakers. In the realities of Polish fi fties, still in Stalinist period, simple knowledge 
of languages from the enemy camp was enough to merit attention from the dreaded 
security apparatus. At the same time, only people deemed to be politically reliable 
and loyal to the Party were allowed to go abroad. The problem was even more severe 
in case of the Polish Army offi  cers, essential for the ICSC work, who rarely knew any 
foreign language at all (beside Russian). The political line of the Polish Delegation 
was based on the defense of the interests of the communist side. However, despite 
Canadian worries, the documents do not show any remote control from Moscow or 
Warsaw. Polish ambassadors were given instructions in Warsaw and consulted with 
government authorities in Moscow and Beijing along their way to Indochina, but the 
decision-making on the spot was left to them, with trust that they would know how 
to properly support the people’s side. Until the escalation of American intervention 
7  Secretary of State for External Aff airs to Commissioner, International Supervisory Commission 
for Vietnam, August 24, 1954, Dear Mr. Lett [in:] Documents on Canadian External Relations, pp. 1716–
1724.
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during Kennedy administration, Kremlin perceived Indochina as unimportant periph-
ery of the global struggle against capitalism. Thus, the Polish representative in ICSC 
could be left without direct supervision, as long as he abided with the general com-
munist line of interests. Interestingly, one of the main priorities of the Polish delega-
tion was “defense of democratic freedoms” throughout Vietnam, since in the evalu-
ation of the Communists, “even the existence of formal democracy (in the bourgeois 
sense) ensures the victory of the popular forces.”8 Of course this was really true only 
in the South Vietnam. In the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the role of the Polish 
Delegation was to act as a shield for their communist brethren and their activities.
Same as Canadians, Poles assumed that the key to success would be to gain the 
backing from the delegate of India. In the instructions issued prior to the fi rst joint 
conference of the ICSC members, Polish Delegate was clearly told that “tactics re-
quires that the Indians should not be antagonized.”9 Communists hoped that by ap-
plauding the openly declared neutrality and anti-colonialism of Indians, they would 
be able to pull them into anti-American positions.
OPERATION PASSAGE TO FREEDOM
As it was mentioned at the very beginning, most sides assumed that free move-
ment of people between both zones would be one of the technicalities of ceasefi re 
agreements, simply a way to peacefully evacuate government servants, soldiers, and 
their families from the North, and Viet Minh partisan units from the South.10 Howev-
er, South Vietnamese prime minister, Ngo Dinh Diem, with the extensive support of 
United States, France and Great Britain, decided to bring as many of his compatriots 
to the South as possible. He had several reasons for that. Since most of his political 
backing came from Catholic regions in the North Vietnam, he was in danger of losing 
that support. At the same time, there were fears about communist reprisals against 
Catholics in the North. Mass movement of people from North to South was also sup-
posed to be a political statement, legitimizing Ngo Dinh Diem’s rule. Last but no the 
least, every movement of people from north to south weakened communist North and 
strengthened pro-western South.
South propaganda campaign, sponsored and supported by Americans, was multi-
faceted. Undercover agents were sent to market squares in the North, to spread vari-
ous rumors of imminent calamities that will soon visit the communist-ruled country, 
for example they claimed that Chinese were coming back (Chinese left a lot of bad 
8  Report by Przemysław Ogrodziński from 19 September 1954, coming from the Polish Ministry of 
Foreign Aff air Archives. Raport nr. 2, zespół 12, wiązka 77, teczka 1327, MKNiK w Wietnamie (Raporty 
delegacji polskiej) 1954, Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych [hereafter AMSZ], Warszawa.
9  Internal memorandum of Polish Ministry of Foreign Aff airs from 20 August 1954. Towarzysz 
Minister Dr. St. Skrzeszewski, w gmachu, z. 12, w. 62, t. 1226, MKNiK w Indochinach (Sprawy 
organizacyjno-kadrowe w Komisji) 1954, AMSZ, Warszawa.
10  R. Jasica, Problem wietnamski. Aspekty prawne i polityczne, Katowice 1977, pp. 124–125.
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memories when they occupied northern Vietnam right after World War II), or that the 
Americans will bomb whole country after the 300 days. Local astrologers were paid 
to publish predictions about great misfortune that will befell the North. Catholics 
were urged to move south with slogans like “the Virgin Mary has departed from the 
North” and “Christ has gone south.”11 This propaganda was aided by local priests, 
and often whole villages decided to move. Beside the religious aspect, the relocation 
was also motivated by the fear of the reprisal – Catholic communities were most 
anticommunist and pro-French part of society in the North Vietnam, and after Dien 
Bien Phu and Geneva Conference, dreaded bloody retribution from the victorious 
Viet Minh.
Eff orts of Vietnamese were aided by Americans led by colonel Edward Lansdale, 
sent to Vietnam by CIA, an offi  cer experienced in propaganda and psy-ops from his 
service in Philippines, where he helped government forces to quell Huk uprising.12 
Lansdale became close advisor to Diem and soon his personal friend, and aided him 
extensively in next few years. However, while the volume of American aid and coun-
sel was quite high, it’s infl uence should not be overestimated. Older literature tends 
to paint Lansdale as a true mastermind behind the success of operation Passage to 
Freedom. More recent publication tend to emphasize the complexity of the factors 
behind the whole enterprise, and also stress the personal role of Ngo Dinh Diem in 
both encouraging the migration of his compatriots, and the way they were settled in 
the South Vietnam.13
Those activities were of course countered by Viet Minh authorities in the North, 
who for example warned refugees that Americans will cook and eat them, or that they 
would open cargo doors of their ships on high seas and drown everybody.14 How-
ever, compared to the eff orts of the other side, the communist response was weak 
and lacked focus. In addition, despite Viet Minh leadership orders, some local com-
manders and political cadres forcefully prevented people from leaving and organized 
show trials of local notables and priest, thus reinforcing fears of local population and 
validating Southern propaganda.
One additional factor also probably played important role in convincing people to 
move from North to South Vietnam: fear of famine. Years of warfare devastated Red 
River Delta and whole Tonkin area. Fields were unattended, essential infrastructure 
11  S. Jacobs, Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 
Lanham 2006, p. 56.
12  More about Huk uprising in: L. M. Greenberg, The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of 
a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946–1955, Washington 1987, pp. XI + 159.
13  For traditional narration about Lansdale see: K. Ruane, War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930–75, 
London–Bristol 1998, p. 38; M. B. Young, J. Fi tzgerald, A. T. Grunfeld, The Vietnam War: A History 
in Documents, Oxford–New York 2003, p. 41; M. Isserman, Vietnam War, New York 2003, pp. 23–25. 
For more recent evaluation of Diem’s and Lansdale’s roles, see: E. Mil ler, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, 
the United States and the Fate of South Vietnam, Cambridge–London 2013, p. 420.
14  Both American and French navies extensively used LST (Landing Ship, Tank), equipped with 
large doors and a ramp in the bow, which allowed them to dock and set off  without port facilities.
R. B. Frankum, Operation Passage to Freedom: The United States Navy in Vietnam, 1954–1955, 
Lubbock 2007, p. 202.
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destroyed or neglected, and the ability of Viet Minh government to effi  ciently man-
age the restoration of agriculture and the distribution of food was still untested. In 
addition, North was always dependent on the southern rice basket of Mekong Delta, 
Saigon government was promising grain, tax exemptions, farm animals and land to 
cultivate, while American 89$ hangouts for refugees were higher than a yearly 85% 
income of average Vietnamese. Last but not the least, the memory of last mass starva-
tion in years 1944-46 was still painfully fresh in Red River Delta.15
In the end, we do not know the exact number of people that moved from North 
to South Vietnam. According to the COMIGAL,16 768,672 refugees were transported 
by air and sea by French, American and British ships. In addition, Saigon govern-
ment estimated that around 109,000 additional people moved to the South by their 
own means. According to the ICSC documents, 892,876 refugees evacuated from 
North, and only 4,269 moved in other direction.17 The exact number is impossible 
to determine, since on the one hand, many people moved on their own, without the 
government aid and ICSC supervision. On the other hand, there were known cases of 
crafty individuals who migrated several times, each time collecting government and 
US aid for refugees. The actual number of refugees who moved south could exceeded 
one million, and it would be even higher if it were not for the communist authorities 
actively preventing people from leaving.18
ROLE AND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ICSC
The international commission established in Geneva occupied a peculiar position 
in Vietnam – with no legal tools to compel or infl uence the governments it was sup-
posed to supervise and control, ICSC could only point out to them potential Geneva 
Agreements violations. The only stick in the Commission’s possession was a possi-
bility of sending a letter to Geneva Conference co-chairmen (USSR and Great Brit-
ain) to inform them about the accords violation and urging them to act.
However, especially in the fi rst years of ICSC existence, both Vietnamese states 
wanted to avoid negative publicity associated with potential Geneva Agreements 
violations, and so even mere presence of the Commission offi  cials sometimes was 
enough to prevent them from said violations. As it was already mentioned, most 
of the human traffi  c was from North to South, thus most incidents and problems 
appeared in the northern Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Communist cadres, es-
pecially on local level, were not too keen to allow people to leave, especially on the 
scale that emerged in the fall of 1954. This was both from ideological reasons (aban-
15  S. Jacobs, Cold War Mandarin, p. 133. About the importance of fear of hunger in: Mieczysław 
Manel i, War of the Vanquished, New York–Evanstone–San Francisco–London 1971, pp. 38–40.
16  The South Vietnamese government agency responsible for the migration.
17  R. Jasica, Problem wietnamski, p. 140.
18  M. Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965, Cambridge 2006, pp. 39–40.
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doning communist country) and more down-to-earth ones (people leaving en masse 
put great strain on the young country’s economy).
Obstructions created by the communist administration took various forms: lack 
or suppression of information for the people about the possibility of migration to the 
South, refusal to issue travel permits, obstructions in access to offi  ces issuing said 
permits, and so on. The communists also tried to prevent any uncontrolled contact 
of the population with ICSC members, with the exception of selected cadres, who 
orchestrated staged protests and delivered petitions, listing real and imagined crimes 
committed by the French and their allies.  
Without surprise, the attitude of Commission members to the human migration 
from North to South Vietnam was not unanimous. From the Polish Delegation point 
of view, Southern Vietnamese, French and Americans were bending the spirit of Ge-
neva Agreements with their insistent and misleading propaganda, especially with the 
prospect of upcoming unifi cation elections, which made any escape from the Com-
munists to the South pointless. Polish Delegation members advised and cooperated 
with DRV authorities, at times going very far outside of their nominal role in the 
Commission.19
The Commission operated in the North Vietnam with the help of seven fi xed 
teams, and variable number of mobile teams, sent ad hoc to conduct investigations 
of reported violations. Such group typically consisted of three offi  cers from member 
countries,20 French and DRV liaison offi  cers, and interpreters, also provided by both 
sides.
A good example of such a team’s activity could be the trip of the Mobile Group 
No. 17, which on 27 November–3 December 1954 examined the application of the 
Article 14 (d) of the Geneva Agreements in the village of Phat Diem and other sur-
rounding villages.21 The team wanted to check if local authorities granted permits 
to priests and nuns who have expressed their desire to move South, present in Phat 
Diem; to ascertain the time period for which the permits were issued; to examine and 
elucidate the diff erence between the number of permits and number of permits previ-
ously reported to have been issued; to ascertain if local authorities are prepared to 
give fi nancial assistance in needy cases to cover transportation costs and report about 
the number of persons who do require such fi nancial assistance.
Phat Diem was actually a place where nearly 10,000 refugees congregated in 
early October 1954, and some of the local priests were arrested by communist for 
19  Mieczysław Maneli, the legal adviser of the Polish Delegation, recalled about special conferences 
held with provincial and district authorities: “I took part in it, not in my capacity as the legal and political 
adviser, of the Polish delegation, but as a representative of the friendly Polish Workers’ party and specialist 
on the questions of international law and foreign policy arising out of the Geneva Accords.” M. Manel i, 
The War of the Vanquished, transl. from the Polish by M. de Görgey, New York 1971, pp. 41–42.
20  Polish offi  cers were usually accompanied by Polish translators, both because of their lack of 
language skills, and as a way to control each other.
21  Report of 17 Mobile Team (Reconstituted) on the Application of Article 14(d) of the Geneva 
Agreement in the Village of Phat Diem And Surrounding Villages, z. 12, w. 92, t. 1404, MKNiK 
w Wietnamie. Raporty Grup MKNiK w Wietnamie (w jęz. angielskim), oraz projekt instrukcji dla grup 
w Wietnamie. 1954–55, AMSZ, Warszawa.
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their pro-migration “propaganda.” Only after the ICSC mobile team intervention, 
local authorities transported 8,268 people on motor boats to the French evacuation 
zone.22 Mobile Grup No. 17 was also supposed to check if there were still any people 
in the town who wanted to go to the South.
The team contacted local authorities, and after obtaining information that Pham 
Diem district is sub-divided into four communes, planned its activities. At this point 
ICSC personnel knew about 615 people that wanted to go South who placed 104 pe-
titions in petition boxes in the district. The plan was as follows: one commune will 
be visited by the team every day, its northern part in the morning and southern in the 
afternoon; the security personnel accompanying the team should be reduced to mini-
mum, and should not move ahead of the team, to ensure the free access for people; 
local authorities were to be informed one day ahead so that information about the tour 
could be passed to respective communes.
On the fi rst day, the team wanted to visit the cathedral to ensure that people gath-
ered there knew about new method of applying for permits.23 However, they were 
stopped by a crowd, who demanded ICSC team to listen to their complains. After 
one hour the chairman suggested that any further complains should be put up in the 
form of a petition and requested the crowd to disperse and allow the team to proceed 
to their original objective. Despite that, gathered people did not move, and after lo-
cal authorities failed to disperse the crowd, the team decided to return to its place of 
residence.
The cathedral was reached on the next day, where the team noticed a number 
of soldiers. Local authorities assured that military was present only to prevent the 
people from gathering like the day before, however nobody approached the ICSC 
personnel to express their desire to migrate South.
On 29 November  the team went to the offi  ce issuing the travel permits, and met 
there with the heads of communes, to make sure they were aware of the existing pro-
cedure for obtaining the permits. The next day ICSC personnel toured both parts of 
Luu Phuong – Phat Diem commune. The security detail was reduced to minimum and 
not allowed to move ahead of the team. In eff ect, twenty seven families, consisting of 
194 people came forward and proclaimed their desire to move South.
On 1 December ICSC inspected the commune of Thuong Kiem. Twenty nine 
families consisting of 198 members came to see the team and declared their willing-
ness to go to the South. Three of those families requested fi nancial help. In addition, 
72 nuns from the cathedral compound and local hospital also showed their desire to 
proceed south. The next day ICSC visited the commune of Cong Van. Nine families 
22  First Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, 
August 11, 1954 to December 10, 1954, z. 12, w. 96, t. 1400, M.K.NiK w Wietnamie. Raport okresowy 
1954 r.
23  Earlier joint application was rejected by the local authorities “as being irregular.” Report of 
17 Mobile Team (Reconstituted) on the Application of Article 14(d) of the Geneva Agreement in the 
Village of Phat Diem and Surrounding Villages, z. 12, w. 92, t. 1404, MKNiK w Wietnamie. Raporty 
Grup MKNiK w Wietnamie (w jęz. angielskim), oraz projekt instrukcji dla grup w Wietnamie. 1954–55, 
AMSZ, Warszawa.
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consisting of 47 members came forward and expressed their desire to move to the 
South, and three families requested fi nancial help. People from this commune in-
formed the team that they were told by priests and nuns that there will be a war and 
atomic bomb will be used, and were pressed in such way to go south. ICSC personnel 
assured them that should have no fear and make their own decisions not paying atten-
tion to any external propaganda. The team also faced constant demonstrations against 
the French interpreter, Mr. Van, assigned to it, with people accusing him of commit-
ting atrocities whilst being a priest in Phat Diem. However, there were no incidents 
and demonstrators, while constantly present, were kept away from the team.24
On the last day, the team toured the fourth commune named Trung Trac. Nobody 
from this place expressed any desire to move to the South. At the meeting with the 
Chairman of the Administrative and Military Committee of Phat Diem, the team con-
ferred about the possible fi nancial help for the families who requested such assistance 
to move south. After that the team returned to its place of residence and sent a signal 
to the International Commission asking for the withdrawal after the completion of 
assigned task. However it was ordered to stay in the Phat Diem until the end of the 
December. In that period the team provided assistance in solving the problem of 
travel permits which appeared between the local authorities and some of the priests.
Overall, it would seem that the ICSC team did not found anything really disturb-
ing in the Phat Diem and its surrounding communes, perhaps with the exception of 
the travel delay caused by the crowd during the fi rst day. General public seemed 
informed enough about the Article 14(d) of the Geneva Agreements, the team’s free-
dom of movement was generally unrestricted, local authorities were cooperative, and 
the ICSC personnel was satisfi ed with the organizational side of issuing of the travel 
permits. However, there is an additional document attached to the report, which sheds 
a bit diff erent light on the situation in Phat Diem area.
As we can read in the fi rst paragraph of the Observations and Comments by the 
Canadian Member, “the Canadian member feels that the report does not adequately 
deal with all of the aspects that have to do with the application of Article 14(d) in 
Phat-Diem area...”25 As the author points out, the team was not really able to check if 
the permit offi  ce was easily accessible, since even though local authorities reported 
each day the number of permits issued on that day, ICSC personnel never saw any 
recent permits, or people actually obtaining them. 
The Canadian offi  cer also had strong doubts about local authorities providing any 
actual support for the families requesting assistance in moving south. Also he felt 
that “far from assisting the team to do its job of fi nding out how many wanted to go 
south, the local authority used a number of stratagems to prevent those people from 
getting to us.”26 In the opinion of author, the crowd that blocked the team’s way on the 
24  These demonstrations were occurring all the time from the day the ICSC team reached the 
cathedral compound on 29 November. Ibid.
25  Appendix “B”, Observations and Comments by the Canadian Member, z. 12, w. 92, t. 1404, 
MKNiK w Wietnamie. Raporty Grup MKNiK w Wietnamie (w jęz. angielskim), oraz projekt instrukcji dla 
grup w Wietnamie. 1954–55, AMSZ, Warszawa.
26  Ibid.
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November 27 could be easily dispersed by the accompanying guards, who however 
did not act when they were requested to. The demonstrations mentioned earlier, di-
rected at French Union Forces interpreter, were instigated by “in most cases the same 
individuals.”27 The Canadian offi  cer recognized one young individual on several oc-
casions, each time in diff erent clothing, and at one point dressed as and standing with 
local administrative cadre.
When it came to the team request to not allow security guards to go ahead of it, in 
the Canadian member opinion it was kept in eff ect for only few hours, and not whole 
tour, like the main ICSC report would suggest. What’s more, all the time the team was 
preceded by the local administrative cadres, moving ahead and on both sides along 
the ICSC personnel. On several occasions both Canadian offi  cers present observed 
those cadres dispersing or holding back people that were trying to approach the team. 
Most of the time “it was done so quickly and furtively that it was impossible to bring 
the fact to the attention of the Chairman of the team in time,”28 and only in some rare 
cases the people were able to reach the team.29
The Canadian member also wondered, how was it possible that every person that 
had physical diffi  culty approaching the team turned out to be someone that wanted 
to go South, while people wishing to complain against local clergy were present 
practically all the time along the team’s route. The Canadian offi  cer ended his docu-
ment with observation that during the team’s visit to cathedral compound, he noticed 
numerous armed guards around one of the buildings. When the team was nearby, 
a nun tried to leave the structure and approach the ISCS personnel, however she was 
instantly pushed back inside by the armed guards. Again, the incident was too fast to 
be observed by the Chairman of the team.
As we can see, not everything was as normal and dull as the main ISCS team 
report would suggest. However the situation in Phat Diem area was actually quite 
typical. Local population knew the propaganda coming from the South and was en-
couraged to migrate by the local clergy, who were also moving south. While not 
everybody wanted to move, the number was certainly higher than local communist 
cadres wanted to admit or accept. People were discouraged or simply not allowed 
to leave the area and move to evacuation points. At the same time, those who were 
able to evade local cadres and reach ICSC team were registered and could hope to 
be allowed to migrate, since they managed to appear on the radar of the Commis-
sion. However, as we could read in Canadian member report, not everybody were so 
lucky. It is also worth to remember that Phat Diem was quite peaceful on the average, 
in some places communist troops fought with the local people and forced them to 
remain only with the threat or the actual appliance of violence.
27  Ibid.
28  Ibid.
29  “On another occasion four women could be seen, in the clear, some 30 meters on the other side of 
a 15-meter wide canal. A man dressed in the fashion of the administrative cadre personnel was with them 
trying to convince them to go back. The women ignored him for a while and fi nally shouted across to the 
team, one of them reached the team walking up to her chest across the canal.” Ibid.
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In much more known incident in the town of Ba Lang that took place at the start 
of 1955, local fi shermen who came into contact with French sailors were arrested by 
communist authorities. In turn, local population turned against the soldiers and ad-
ministration, disarmed them and occupied the cathedral compound in Ba Lang. The 
stand-off  came to end only after large Viet Minh military reinforcements arrived on 
8 January, and arrested more than 200 people. The French side requested ICSC team 
to be sent to Ba Lang even before the incident, foreseeing the troubles that could rise 
there due to large numbers of refugees converging in the town cathedral compound 
grounds by the end of 1954. However, the dispatch was delayed until 3 January by the 
DRV Liaison Offi  cer, and even then, the team was kept by armed guards in the pro-
vincial capital of Thanh-Hoa30 until 8 January, when communist authorities already 
managed to quell all resistance.31
Interesting regularity emerges from ICSC documents: the most vigilant members 
of mobile teams in the DRV were the Canadians, which is not surprising since they 
were the ones most interested in spotting potential Geneva Agreements violations by 
the communist side, and were especially sensitive about the plight of fellow Chris-
tians32 during the period of free movement.
The Indian chairmen in the mobile teams were clinging to their ideal of neutrality 
and impartiality, which meant most of the times they intervened only when person-
ally faced with undeniable violation of Geneva Agreements.
It was quite diff erent story with the Polish members of ICSC. They were no less 
perceptive than their Canadian colleagues. Actually, they had to be even more watchful, 
since in their role of the shield of the communist actions, they had to spot or even fore-
see potential violations of Geneva Agreements before other team members. If the infor-
mation about such an event would reach the Commission, the Poles used every possible 
trick to give time and possibility for the North Vietnamese to clean up after their illegal 
activities. As the ambassador Sherwood Lett33 confi ded in his letter to Lester Pearson:
A month’s close association daily with the Polish Ambassador, and his subordinates, has con-
vinced me that whatever his attitude and instructions may have been in the early stages of the 
Commission’s work, he is defi nitely now playing the Communist game of obstruction, evasion, 
stalling, double talk, legalistic and technical objections and any other tactic he can employ to 
assist the D.R. authorities to carry out the provisions of the Geneva Agreement to the exclusive 
30  Around 40 km from Ba Lang.
31  The ICSC fi nal report was critical both about the treatment of the team by local authorities and 
the communist actions that led to the confrontation (refusal to issue travel permits). However, thanks to 
the eff orts of the Polish member, the team also put a share of the blame on the French, claiming that the 
presence of their ship “show an unnatural interest on the part of the French authorities in this area.” Press 
Communique, Ba Lanh Incident, z. 12, w. 77, t. 1330, MKNiK w Wietnamie (Sprawozdania z działalności 
Komisji w jęz. angielskim) 1955, AMSZ, Warszawa.
32  The freedom of movement was the main axis of the Canadian policy inside the Commission, both 
because of the US pressure, but also the home public opinion, concerned about the fate of Christians 
under the communist rule. J. Słowiak, “Working with the Enemy: Polish Perception of the Canadian 
Delegation in the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam,” TransCanadiana: 
Polish Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue Polonaise d’Études cannadiennes 2015, t. 7, pp. 54–55.
33  The fi rst chief of the Canadian Delegation.
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advantage of Communist policy. I would go so far at the moment to say that I think that he or 
someone of his political views is either directly or indirectly consulting with and advising the 
new D.R. regime.34
Indeed the Poles were both advising and regularly consulting with Hanoi leader-
ship, and also held no sentiment for the people willing to escape the youngest member 
state of the international communist family. In the report sent to Warsaw by the Polish 
deputy representative to ICSC, he describes how Polish Delegation tried to present 
the problem of travel permits issuing in Phat Diem as purely caused by authorities on 
local level, to shield the DRV central authorities in Hanoi from accusations of delib-
erately violating the Article 14(d). Poles managed to convince the Indian Delegation 
to such interpretation, which along with various other legal tricks resulted in the fi nal 
report only mildly reminding communist side to put more eff ort into implementation 
of the arrangements from Geneva.35
In other incident, the ICSC was faced with French request to intervene to protect 
4,000 members of their former irregular units in the region of Pakha, who were being 
attacked by DRV military. However, as Polish report noted:
Our tactics on the freedom committee consisted above all of multiplying doubts about particu-
lar facts and the possibilities of using individual articles, so we could drag the whole issue as 
much as possible, thereby giving our friends the chance to actually solve the problem – that is 
to liquidate the band, purposefully left behind by the French.36
As we can see, the Polish Delegation indeed was “playing the Communist game 
of obstruction, evasion, stalling, double talk, legalistic and technical objections.” It 
is interesting to note however, that while complaining about the Polish attitude, the 
chief of Canadian Delegation was more concerned with the other member of the 
Commission: “I am not so concerned with Polish moves which can now be predicted 
quite easily in most cases as with the Indian attitude.”37
 CONCLUSIONS
Despite of internal disputes and confl icting interests of its members, International 
Commission for Supervision and Control did as much as it could to fulfi ll the man-
dated task of supervising the free movement of people guaranteed by the articles of 
34  Commissioner, International Supervisory Commission for Vietnam, to Secretary of State for 
External Aff airs, December 2, 1954, Dear Mike [Pearson] [in:] Documents on Canadian External 
Relations, pp. 1767–69.
35  Sprawozdanie z pracy Komitetu Swobód za okres styczeń–luty i dekadę marca 1955, z. 12, w. 77, 
t. 1333, M.K.NiK w Wietnamie (Raporty okresowe delegacji polskiej) 1955 r., AMSZ, Warszawa.
36  Ibid.
37  Commissioner, International Supervisory Commission for Vietnam, to Secretary of State for 
External Aff airs, December 31, 1954, Indian and Polish Attitudes [in:] Documents on Canadian External 
Relations, pp. 1788–1790.
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the Geneva Agreements. In many cases the simple presence of international observ-
ers was enough for the local communist authorities to allow people to leave, just 
like absence of said observers sometimes doomed hopeful migrants to remain. ICSC 
could do not much more since it had no authority over the sides of the armistice and 
it eff ectiveness depended on their good will – it could only appeal to them or inform 
the Chairmen of the Geneva Conference about any violations of the accords or ob-
structions of ICSC work.
In the end, despite of the eff orts of Democratic Republic of Vietnam authorities, 
ardently aided by the Polish Delegation in the ICSC, vast wave of migrants did move 
to the South, with over eight hundred thousand persons registered in the Commission 
offi  cial documents, which were by no means the fi nal number of people that decided 
to leave the North Vietnam during tumultuous period of 1954–1955.
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